Gecko [ gandhischool.edu.np ]

Name	Size	Permission
snap-confine.core.17247	28.68 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-confine.snapd.25202	31.43 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-confine.snapd.25577	31.43 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-update-ns.certbot	6.04 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-update-ns.core	6 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap-update-ns.lxd	6.14 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.certbot.certbot	777 B	-rw-r--r--
snap.certbot.hook.configure	800 B	-rw-r--r--
snap.certbot.hook.prepare-plug...	834 B	-rw-r--r--
snap.certbot.renew	771 B	-rw-r--r--
snap.core.hook.configure	22.46 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.activate	28.43 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.benchmark	28.43 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.buginfo	28.43 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.check-kernel	28.44 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.daemon	30.25 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.hook.configure	29.94 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.hook.install	23.12 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.hook.remove	28.44 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.lxc	28.42 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.lxc-to-lxd	28.44 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.lxd	28.42 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.migrate	28.43 KB	-rw-r--r--
snap.lxd.user-daemon	30.26 KB	-rw-r--r--

Code Editor : snap.lxd.hook.remove

# vim:syntax=apparmor

#include <tunables/global>

#include if exists "/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/home.d"
#include if exists "/var/lib/snapd/apparmor/snap-tuning"

# snapd supports the concept of 'parallel installs' where snaps with the same
# name are differentiated by '_<instance>' such that foo, foo_bar and foo_baz
# may all be installed on the system. To support this, SNAP_NAME is set to the
# name (eg, 'foo') while SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME is set to the instance name (eg
# 'foo_bar'). The profile name and most rules therefore reference
# SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME. In some cases, snapd will adjust the snap's runtime
# environment so the snap doesn't have to be aware of the distinction (eg,
# SNAP, SNAP_DATA and SNAP_COMMON are all bind mounted onto a directory with
# SNAP_NAME so the security policy will allow writing to both locations (since
# they are equivalent).

# This is a snap name without the instance key
@{SNAP_NAME}="lxd"
# This is a snap name with instance key
@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}="lxd"
@{SNAP_INSTANCE_DESKTOP}="lxd"
@{SNAP_COMMAND_NAME}="hook.remove"
@{SNAP_REVISION}="35819"
@{PROFILE_DBUS}="snap_2elxd_2ehook_2eremove"
@{INSTALL_DIR}="/{,var/lib/snapd/}snap"

profile "snap.lxd.hook.remove" flags=(attach_disconnected,mediate_deleted) {
  #include <abstractions/base>
  #include <abstractions/consoles>
  #include <abstractions/openssl>

# While in later versions of the base abstraction, include this explicitly
  # for series 16 and cross-distro
  /etc/ld.so.preload r,

# The base abstraction doesn't yet have this
  /etc/sysconfig/clock r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/maps k,

# /proc/XXXX/map_files contains the same info than /proc/XXXX/maps, but
  # in a format that is simpler to manage, because it doesn't require to
  # parse the text data inside a file, but just reading the contents of
  # a directory.
  # Reading /proc/XXXX/maps is already allowed in the base template
  # via <abstractions/base>. Also, only the owner can read it, and the
  # kernel limits access to it by requiring 'ptrace' enabled, so allowing
  # to access /proc/XXXX/map_files can be considered secure too.
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/map_files/ r,

# While the base abstraction has rules for encryptfs encrypted home and
  # private directories, it is missing rules for directory read on the toplevel
  # directory of the mount (LP: #1848919)
  owner @{HOME}/.Private/ r,
  owner @{HOMEDIRS}/.ecryptfs/*/.Private/ r,

# for python apps/services
  #include <abstractions/python>
  /etc/python3.[0-9]*/**                                r,

# explicitly deny noisy denials to read-only filesystems (see LP: #1496895
# for details)
deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/ w,
deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/**.pyc.[0-9]* w,
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**/__pycache__/             w,
deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**/__pycache__/*.pyc.[0-9]* w,

# for perl apps/services
  #include <abstractions/perl>
  # Missing from perl abstraction
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/auto/**.so* mr,

# Note: the following dangerous accesses should not be allowed in most
  # policy, but we cannot explicitly deny since other trusted interfaces might
  # add them.
  # Explicitly deny ptrace for now since it can be abused to break out of the
  # seccomp sandbox. https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/18/823
  #audit deny ptrace (trace),

# Explicitly deny capability mknod so apps can't create devices
  #audit deny capability mknod,

# Explicitly deny mount, remount and umount so apps can't modify things in
  # their namespace
  #audit deny mount,
  #audit deny remount,
  #audit deny umount,

# End dangerous accesses

# Note: this potentially allows snaps to DoS other snaps via resource
  # exhaustion but we can't sensibly mediate this today. In the future we may
  # employ cgroup limits, AppArmor rlimit mlock rules or something else.
  capability ipc_lock,

# for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
  # user-specific bash files
  /etc/bash.bashrc r,
  /etc/inputrc r,
  /etc/environment r,
  /etc/profile r,

# user/group/seat lookups
  /etc/{passwd,group,nsswitch.conf} r,  # very common
  /var/lib/extrausers/{passwd,group} r,
  /run/systemd/users/[0-9]* r,
  /etc/default/nss r,

# libnss-systemd (subset from nameservice abstraction)
  #
  #   https://systemd.io/USER_GROUP_API/
  #   https://systemd.io/USER_RECORD/
  #   https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-systemd.html
  #
  # Allow User/Group lookups via common VarLink socket APIs. Applications need
  # to either consult all of them or the io.systemd.Multiplexer frontend.
  /run/systemd/userdb/ r,
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Multiplexer rw,
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.DynamicUser rw,        # systemd-exec users
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Home rw,               # systemd-home dirs
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.NameServiceSwitch rw,  # UNIX/glibc NSS
  /run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Machine rw,            # systemd-machined

/etc/libnl-3/{classid,pktloc} r,      # apps that use libnl

# For snappy reexec on 4.8+ kernels
  /usr/lib/snapd/snap-exec m,

# For gdb support
  /usr/lib/snapd/snap-gdb-shim ixr,
  /usr/lib/snapd/snap-gdbserver-shim ixr,

# For in-snap tab completion
  /etc/bash_completion.d/{,*} r,
  /usr/lib/snapd/etelpmoc.sh ixr,               # marshaller (see complete.sh for out-of-snap unmarshal)
  /usr/share/bash-completion/bash_completion r, # user-provided completions (run in-snap) may use functions from here

# uptime
  @{PROC}/uptime r,
  @{PROC}/loadavg r,

# Allow reading /etc/os-release. On Ubuntu 16.04+ it is a symlink to /usr/lib
  # which is allowed by the base abstraction, but on 14.04 it is an actual file
  # so need to add it here. Also allow read locks on the file.
  /etc/os-release rk,
  /usr/lib/os-release k,

# Debian version of the host OS which might be required in AppArmor-secured Debian
  /etc/debian_version r,

# systemd native journal API (see sd_journal_print(4)). This should be in
  # AppArmor's base abstraction, but until it is, include here. We include
  # the base journal path as well as the journal namespace pattern path. Each
  # journal namespace for quota groups will be prefixed with 'snap-'.
  /run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/socket w,
  /run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/stdout rw, # 'r' shouldn't be needed, but journald
                                            # doesn't leak anything so allow
  /run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/dev-log w,

# snapctl and its requirements
  /usr/bin/snapctl ixr,
  /usr/lib/snapd/snapctl ixr,
  @{PROC}/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,
  /run/snapd-snap.socket rw,

# Note: for now, don't explicitly deny this noisy denial so --devmode isn't
  # broken but eventually we may conditionally deny this since it is an
  # information leak.
  #deny /{,var/}run/utmp r,

# Allow reading the maximum number of open file descriptors.
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/nr_open r,

# java
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/ r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/fd/ r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/auxv r,
  @{PROC}/sys/vm/zone_reclaim_mode r,
  /etc/lsb-release r,
  /sys/devices/**/read_ahead_kb r,
  /sys/devices/system/cpu/** r,
  /sys/devices/system/node/node[0-9]*/* r,
  /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled r,
  /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/defrag r,
  # NOTE: this leaks running process but java seems to want it (even though it
  # seems to operate ok without it) and SDL apps crash without it. Allow owner
  # match until AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly (see
  # LP: #1546825 for details). comm is a subset of cmdline, so allow it too.
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cmdline r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/comm r,

# Per man(5) proc, the kernel enforces that a thread may only modify its comm
  # value or those in its thread group.
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/@{tid}/comm rw,

# Allow reading and writing to our file descriptors in /proc which, for
  # example, allow access to /dev/std{in,out,err} which are all symlinks to
  # /proc/self/fd/{0,1,2} respectively. To support the open(..., O_TMPFILE)
  # linkat() temporary file technique, allow all fds. Importantly, access to
  # another task's fd via this proc interface is mediated via 'ptrace (read)'
  # (readonly) and 'ptrace (trace)' (read/write) which is denied by default, so
  # this rule by itself doesn't allow opening another snap's fds via proc.
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/{,task/@{tid}}fd/[0-9]* rw,

# Miscellaneous accesses
  /dev/{,u}random w,
  /etc/machine-id r,
  /etc/mime.types r,
  /etc/default/keyboard r,
  @{PROC}/ r,
  @{PROC}/version r,
  @{PROC}/version_signature r,
  /etc/{,writable/}hostname r,
  /etc/{,writable/}localtime r,
  /etc/{,writable/}mailname r,
  /etc/{,writable/}timezone r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cgroup rk,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/cpuset r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/io r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/fdinfo/* r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/limits r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/loginuid r,
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/sessionid r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/smaps r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/stat r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/statm r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/status r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/ r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/smaps r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/stat r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/statm r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/status r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/pipe-max-size r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/hostname r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/osrelease r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/ostype r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/shmmax r,
  # Allow apps to introspect the level of dbus mediation AppArmor implements.
  /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/dbus/mask r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/file-max r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/file-nr r,
  @{PROC}/sys/fs/inotify/max_* r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/boot_id r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/uuid r,
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap r,
  # Allow access to the uuidd daemon (this daemon is a thin wrapper around
  # time and getrandom()/{,u}random and, when available, runs under an
  # unprivilged, dedicated user).
  /run/uuidd/request rw,
  /sys/devices/virtual/tty/{console,tty*}/active r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,user.slice/}memory.limit_in_bytes r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.limit_in_bytes r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.stat r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.max r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,user.slice/}cpu.cfs_{period,quota}_us r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/cpu.cfs_{period,quota}_us r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,user.slice/}cpu.shares r,
  /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/cpu.shares r,
  /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hpage_pmd_size r,
  /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled r,
  /{,usr/}lib/ r,

# Reads of oom_adj and oom_score_adj are safe
  owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_{,score_}adj r,

# Note: for now, don't explicitly deny write access so --devmode isn't broken
  # but eventually we may conditionally deny this since it allows the process
  # to increase the oom heuristic of other processes (make them more likely to
  # be killed). Once AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly,
  # this can safely be allowed since non-root processes won't be able to
  # decrease the value and root processes will only be able to with
  # 'capability sys_resource,' which we deny be default.
  # deny owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_{,score_}adj w,

# Eases hardware assignment (doesn't give anything away)
  /etc/udev/udev.conf r,
  /sys/       r,
  /sys/bus/   r,
  /sys/class/ r,

# this leaks interface names and stats, but not in a way that is traceable
  # to the user/device
  @{PROC}/net/dev r,
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/net/dev r,

# Read-only of this snap
  /var/lib/snapd/snaps/@{SNAP_NAME}_*.snap r,

# Read-only of snapd restart state for snapctl specifically
  /var/lib/snapd/maintenance.json r,

# Read-only for the install directory
  # bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/                   r,
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}}/    r,
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}}/**  mrklix,

# Read-only install directory for other revisions to help with bugs like
  # LP: #1616650 and LP: #1655992
  @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**  mrkix,

# Read-only home area for other versions
  # bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/                  r,
  owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/**                mrkix,

# Experimental snap folder changes
  owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/                    r,
  owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/**                  mrkix,
  owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
  owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/common/**           wl,

owner @{HOME}/Snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/                          r,
  owner @{HOME}/Snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/**                        mrkixwl,

# Writable home area for this version.
  # bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
  owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/common/** wl,

# Read-only system area for other versions
  # bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  /var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/   r,
  /var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/** mrkix,

# Writable system area only for this version
  # bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  /var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
  /var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/common/** wl,

# The snap-confine program creates an app-specific private restricted /tmp
  # and will fail to launch the app if something goes wrong. As such, we can
  # simply allow full access to /tmp.
  /tmp/   r,
  /tmp/** mrwlkix,

# App-specific access to files and directories in /dev/shm. We allow file
  # access in /dev/shm for shm_open() and files in subdirectories for open()
  # bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  /{dev,run}/shm/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.** mrwlkix,
  # Also allow app-specific access for sem_open()
  /{dev,run}/shm/sem.snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.* mrwlk,

# Snap-specific XDG_RUNTIME_DIR that is based on the UID of the user
  # bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
  owner /run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/   rw,
  owner /run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,

# Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via an
  # abstract or anonymous socket
  unix (bind, listen) addr="@snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.**",
  unix peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*),

# Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via DBus.
  # Note: this does not grant access to the DBus sockets of well known buses
  # (will still need to use an appropriate interface for that).
  dbus (receive, send) peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*),
  # In addition to the above, dbus-run-session attempts reading these files
  # from the snap base runtime.
  /usr/share/dbus-1/services/{,*} r,
  /usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/{,*} r,
  # Allow apps to perform DBus introspection on org.freedesktop.DBus for both
  # the system and session buses.
  # Note: this does not grant access to the DBus sockets of these buses, but
  # we grant it here since it is missing from the dbus abstractions
  # (LP: #1866168)
  dbus (send)
      bus={session,system}
      path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
      interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
      member=Introspect
      peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow apps from the same package to signal each other via signals
  signal peer=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*,

# Allow receiving signals from all snaps (and focus on mediating sending of
  # signals)
  signal (receive) peer=snap.*,

# Allow receiving signals from unconfined (eg, systemd)
  signal (receive) peer=unconfined,

# for 'udevadm trigger --verbose --dry-run --tag-match=snappy-assign'
  /{,usr/}{,s}bin/udevadm ixr,
  /etc/udev/udev.conf r,
  /{,var/}run/udev/tags/snappy-assign/ r,
  @{PROC}/cmdline r,
  /sys/devices/**/uevent r,

# LP: #1447237: adding '--property-match=SNAPPY_APP=<pkgname>' to the above
  # requires:
  #   /run/udev/data/* r,
  # but that reveals too much about the system and cannot be granted to apps
  # by default at this time.

# For convenience, allow apps to see what is in /dev even though cgroups
  # will block most access
  /dev/ r,
  /dev/**/ r,

# Allow setting up pseudoterminal via /dev/pts system. This is safe because
  # the launcher uses a per-app devpts newinstance.
  /dev/ptmx rw,

# Do the same with /sys/devices and /sys/class to help people using hw-assign
  /sys/devices/ r,
  /sys/devices/**/ r,
  /sys/class/ r,
  /sys/class/**/ r,

# Allow all snaps to chroot
  capability sys_chroot,

# Lttng tracing is very noisy and should not be allowed by confined apps. Can
  # safely deny for the normal case (LP: #1260491). If/when an lttng-trace
  # interface is needed, we can rework this.
  deny /{dev,run,var/run}/shm/lttng-ust-* rw,

# Allow read-access on /home/ for navigating to other parts of the
  # filesystem. While this allows enumerating users, this is already allowed
  # via /etc/passwd and getent.
  @{HOMEDIRS}/ r,

# Allow read-access to / for navigating to other parts of the filesystem.
  / r,

# Snap-specific run directory. Bind mount *not* used here
  # (see 'parallel installs', above)
  /run/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
  /run/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,

# Snap-specific lock directory and prerequisite navigation permissions.
  /run/lock/ r,
  /run/lock/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
  /run/lock/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,

# Allow listing and reading systemd-provided credentials.
  /run/credentials/ r,
  /run/credentials/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*.service/ r,
  /run/credentials/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*.service/** r,

# Default rules for core base runtimes

# The base abstraction doesn't yet have this
  /{,usr/}lib/terminfo/** rk,
  /usr/share/terminfo/** k,
  /usr/share/zoneinfo/** k,

# for python apps/services
  /usr/bin/python{,2,2.[0-9]*,3,3.[0-9]*} ixr,
  # additional accesses needed for newer pythons in later bases
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/**.{pyc,so}           mr,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/**.{egg,py,pth}       r,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/{site,dist}-packages/ r,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/lib-dynload/*.so      mr,
  /usr/include/python3.[0-9]*/pyconfig.h               r,

# for perl apps/services
  /usr/bin/perl{,5*} ixr,
  # AppArmor <2.12 doesn't have rules for perl-base, so add them here
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/**            r,
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/[0-9]*/**.so* mr,

# for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
  # user-specific bash files
  /{,usr/}bin/bash ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dash ixr,
  /usr/share/terminfo/** r,

# Common utilities for shell scripts
  /{,usr/}bin/arch ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/{,g,m}awk ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/base32 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/base64 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/basename ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bunzip2 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/busctl ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzcat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzdiff ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzgrep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/bzip2 ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/chgrp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/chmod ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/chown ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/clear ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cmp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cpio ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/cut ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/date ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dbus-daemon ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dbus-run-session ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dbus-send ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dd ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/diff{,3} ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/dirname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/du ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/echo ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/{,e,f,r}grep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/env ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/expr ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/false ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/find ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/flock ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/fmt ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/fold ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/getconf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/getent ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/getopt ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/groups ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/gzip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/head ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/hostname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/id ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/igawk ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/infocmp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/kill ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ldd ixr,
  /{usr/,}lib{,32,64}/ld{,32,64}-*.so ix,
  /{usr/,}lib/@{multiarch}/ld{,32,64}-*.so* ix,
  /{,usr/}bin/less{,file,pipe} ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ln ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/line ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/link ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/locale ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/logger ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ls ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/md5sum ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mkdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mkfifo ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mknod ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mktemp ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/more ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/mv ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/nice ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/nohup ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/numfmt ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/od ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/openssl ixr, # may cause harmless capability block_suspend denial
  /{,usr/}bin/paste ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/pgrep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/printenv ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/printf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/ps ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/pwd ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/readlink ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/realpath ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rev ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rm ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/rmdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/run-parts ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sed ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/seq ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/setpriv ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sha{1,224,256,384,512}sum ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/shuf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sleep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sort ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/stat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/stdbuf ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/stty ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/sync ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/systemd-cat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/systemd-creds ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tac ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tail ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tar ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tee ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/test ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tempfile ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tset ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/touch ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tput ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tr ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/true ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/tty ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/uname ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/uniq ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unlink ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unxz ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/unzip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/uptime ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/vdir ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/vim.tiny ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/wc ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/which{,.debianutils} ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/xargs ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/xz ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/yes ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zcat ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/z{,e,f}grep ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zip ixr,
  /{,usr/}bin/zipgrep ixr,

# lsb-release
  /usr/bin/lsb_release ixr,
  /usr/bin/ r,
  /usr/share/distro-info/*.csv r,

# For printing the cache (we don't allow updating the cache)
  /{,usr/}sbin/ldconfig{,.real} ixr,

# Allow all snaps to chroot
  /{,usr/}sbin/chroot ixr,

# Description: Can change to any apparmor profile (including unconfined) thus
# giving access to all resources of the system so LXD may manage what to give
# to its containers. This gives device ownership to connected snaps.
@{PROC}/**/attr/{,apparmor/}current r,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/aa-exec ux,

# Allow discovering the os-release of the host
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/{etc,usr/lib}/os-release r,

# Description: Can query system status information. This is restricted because
# it gives privileged read access to all processes on the system and should
# only be used with trusted apps.

# Needed by 'ps'
@{PROC}/tty/drivers r,

# This ptrace is an information leak. Intentionlly omit 'ptrace (trace)' here
# since since ps doesn't actually need to trace other processes. Note this
# allows a number of accesses (assuming the associated /proc file is allowed),
# such as various memory address locations and esp/eip via /proc/*/stat,
# /proc/*/mem, /proc/*/personality, /proc/*/stack, /proc/*/syscall,
# /proc/*/timerslack_ns and /proc/*/wchan (see man proc).
#
# Some files like /proc/kallsyms (but anything using %pK format specifier) need
# 'capability syslog' when /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict=1, but we
# intentionally do not allow since it could be used to defeat KASLR.
ptrace (read),

# Other miscellaneous accesses for observing the system
@{PROC}/cgroups r,
@{PROC}/buddyinfo r,
@{PROC}/locks r,
@{PROC}/modules r,
@{PROC}/mdstat r,
@{PROC}/schedstat r,
@{PROC}/slabinfo r,
@{PROC}/softirqs r,
@{PROC}/stat r,
@{PROC}/vmstat r,
@{PROC}/zoneinfo r,
@{PROC}/diskstats r,
@{PROC}/kallsyms r,
@{PROC}/partitions r,
@{PROC}/pressure/cpu r,
@{PROC}/pressure/io r,
@{PROC}/pressure/memory r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/panic r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/panic_on_oops r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/poolsize r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/urandom_min_reseed_secs r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/write_wakeup_threshold r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/sched_autogroup_enabled r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/threads-max r,
@{PROC}/sys/vm/max_map_count r,
@{PROC}/sys/vm/panic_on_oom r,
@{PROC}/sys/vm/swappiness r,

# These are not process-specific (/proc/*/... and /proc/*/task/*/...)
@{PROC}/*/{,task/,task/*/} r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}autogroup r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}auxv r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}cgroup r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}cmdline r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}comm r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}exe r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}fdinfo/* r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}io r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}oom_score r,
# allow reading of smaps_rollup, which is a summary of the memory use of a process,
# but not smaps which contains a detailed mappings breakdown like
# /proc/self/maps, which we do not allow access to for other processes
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}smaps_rollup r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}schedstat r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}stat r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}statm r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}status r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}wchan r,

# Allow reading processes security label
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}attr/{,apparmor/}current r,

# Allow discovering the os-release of the host
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/etc/os-release rk,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/usr/lib/os-release rk,

# Allow discovering the Kernel build config
@{PROC}/config.gz r,
/boot/config* r,

# Allow discovering system-wide CFS Bandwidth Control information
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/scheduler/sched-bwc.html
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/cpu.cfs_period_us r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/cpu.cfs_quota_us r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/cpu.shares r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/cpu.stat r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/memory.stat r,

# Allow reading the system max CPU resource constraints
/sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/cpu.max r,

#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>

# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/hostname1
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    member=Get{,All},

# Allow clients to introspect hostname1
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/hostname1
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
    member=Introspect,

# Allow clients to enumerate DBus connection names on common buses
dbus (send)
    bus={session,system}
    path={/,/org/freedesktop/DBus}
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
    member={ListNames,ListActivatableNames}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow clients to obtain the DBus machine ID on common buses. We do not
# mediate the path since any peer can be used.
dbus (send)
    bus={session,system}
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Peer
    member=GetMachineId
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow clients to get properties of systemd (the manager) and
# units
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
    path=/org/freedesktop/systemd1{,/**}
    member=Get{,All}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow clients to explicitly list units with some of their details (path,
# status) and get unit path, see
# https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/dbus/ for details
dbus (send)
    bus=system
    path=/org/freedesktop/systemd1
    interface=org.freedesktop.systemd1.Manager
    member={GetUnit,ListUnits}
    peer=(label=unconfined),

# Allow reading if protected hardlinks are enabled, but don't allow enabling or
# disabling them
@{PROC}/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/protected_symlinks r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/protected_fifos r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/protected_regular r,

# allow use of user namespaces
userns,

# While commands like 'ps', 'ip netns identify <pid>', 'ip netns pids foo', etc
# trigger a 'ptrace (trace)' denial, they aren't actually tracing other
# processes. Unfortunately, the kernel overloads trace such that the LSMs are
# unable to distinguish between tracing other processes and other accesses.
# ptrace (trace) can be used to break out of the seccomp sandbox unless the
# kernel has 93e35efb8de45393cf61ed07f7b407629bf698ea (in 4.8+). Until snapd
# has full ptrace support conditional on kernel support, explicitly deny to
# silence noisy denials/avoid confusion and accidentally giving away this
# dangerous access frivolously.
deny ptrace (trace),
deny capability sys_ptrace,

}

${this.title}

Code Editor : snap.lxd.hook.remove